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EsSAYS ON KELSEN. Edited by Richard Tur and William Twining. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. viii, 345. $44. 
Hans Kelsen remains, for the most part, a towering and enigmatic 
figure to students of legal philosophy. In his Pure Theory of Law, 
Kelsen attempted to raise jurisprudence to the level of genuine science, 
divorcing it from ideology and personal evaluation. Legal scientists, 
Kelsen maintained, must restrain themselves from acting upon the 
prescriptive impulse that often accompanies the description of a legal 
system. 
In an effort to trace Kelsen's attempt to scale the great snowy 
mountain of thought concerning the basis for legal norms, Richard 
Tur1 and William Twining2 present Essays on Ke/sen. No attempt to 
collect essays on Kelsen's jurisprudence has succeeded in over two de-
cades. 3 Daunting as that bleak reality may have been, Tur and Twin-
ing have prevailed, producing a collection of essays based upon papers 
presented at the 1981 annual conference of the United Kingdom Asso-
ciation for Legal and Social Philosophy (pp. 2-3). At the conference, 
thirteen scholars celebrated the centenary of Kelsen's birth by defend-
ing, testing, or simply clarifying much of Kelsen's work. In addition 
to these essays, the book contains a translation of Kelsen's The Func-
tion of a Constitution (p. 109). 
The term "celebrated" is employed here rather loosely. What dis-
tinguishes Essays on Ke/sen from earlier endeavors is the willingness of 
its contributors to attack every assumption Kelsen or his followers 
have made. Past collections of essays have exhibited a tendency to 
apply polish rather than acid to Kelsen's theories.4 Because Essays on 
Ke/sen refrains from such adulation, it stands as a more provocative 
tribute to Hans Kelsen. 
One should attack Essays on Ke/sen as one does a baked potato: 
from the middle outward. Specifically, the reader should begin with at 
least a cursory reading of Iain Stewart's5 translation of Kelsen's The 
Function of a Constitution (p. 109). There simply is no better way to 
view the high country of the Pure Theory than through Kelsen's own 
eyes, and Stewart's crisp translation enables the reader to do just that. 
In addition to supporting its stated thesis, that a constitution serves to 
1. Richard Tur is the Benn Law Fellow at Oriel College, Oxford. 
2. William Twining is the Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at University College, London. 
3. The last attempt was made in 1964. See LAW, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER: EssAYS IN HONOR OF HANS KELSEN (S. Engel ed. 1964). 
4. See, e.g., A Tribute to Hans Ke/sen, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 609 (1971). 
5. Iain Stewart is at the University of Hull. 
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validate lower norms, 6 Kelsen's essay provides a fair picture of his 
reductionist brand of legal positivism. For example, it contains his 
discussion of how the basic norm - the presupposed, nonlegal rule 
that "one ought to conduct oneself as the constitution prescribes" (p. 
116) - is analogous to Kant's view that human actions may be under-
stood by resort to metalegal authorities such as God or nature. In-
deed, this discussion is typical of Kelsen's affinity to Kantian 
philosophy that is the subject of much of the criticism in Essays on 
Ke/sen. Thus, because understanding is a necessary prerequisite for 
informed criticism, those unfamiliar with the details, if not the con-
tours, of Kelsen's jurisprudence would do well to read Stewart's lucid 
translation before turning to the challenges and defenses of Kelsenism. 
One noteworthy attack comes from Alida Wilson.7 In her essay, Is 
Ke/sen Really a Kantian? (p. 37), Wilson challenges the seldom-tested 
view that Kelsen used Kant's metaphysics and epistemology as a map 
up the steep slopes of the Pure Theory of Law. After a meticulous 
examination of Kelsen's jurisprudence and Kant's critique of reason, 
Wilson concludes that if Kelsen is using Kant's map, he has crossed 
much out, penciling in his own directions where convenient. 
Such a frontal attack on the notion that Kant is Kelsen's spiritual 
father demands an airtight case, and Wilson comes close to fashioning 
one. For example, in her attack upon Kelsen's view that zurechnung 8 
is analogous to Kant's account of causality as an a priori principle,9 
6. While "is" statements have a true-false nature, norms do not. Instead, they have their 
own "validity." Specifically, to say that a norm is "valid" is to say that it ought to be applied and 
obeyed. See H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 10 (M. Knight trans. 2d ed. 1967) [here-
inafter PURE THEORY]; Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law: Its Method and Fundamental Con-
cepts, 50 LAW. Q. REv. 474, 485 (1934) [hereinafter Method and Concepts). 
According to Kelsen, the validity of one norm is derived from another, "higher" norm. P. 
111. Consider the norm, "one who steals ought to be punished." The validity of that norm 
comes from a norm expressed in the form of a criminal statute. In tum, the validity of that 
statute comes from the norm, "the legislative body has the authority to make laws." Continuing 
this analysis, the validity of legislative authority is derived from the constitution, which grants 
lawmaking authority to the legislature. 
Given this hierarchical perspective, it is easy to understand Kelsen's view that a constitution 
serves to validate lower norms. The norm that validates a constitution is Kelsen's "basic norm." 
Pp. 114-16. 
7. Alida Wilson is at the University of Aberdeen. 
8. While zurechnung is generally translated as "imputation," see, e.g., PURE THEORY, supra 
note 6, at 76; H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 91-92 (A. Wedberg trans. 
1945) [hereinafter GENERAL THEORY]; H. KELSEN, WHAT JS JUSTICE? 327 (1957), Wilson and 
others have retained the original German to avoid connotations accompanying the English word. 
To Kelsen, the link between the elements of a legal norm - the delict (wrong) and the sanction 
(penalty) - is like the idea of causality connecting antecedent and consequent events in the laws 
of natural science. See Method and Concepts, supra note 6, at 485 ("Just as natural law links a 
certain circumstance to another as cause to effect, so the legal rule links the legal condition to the 
legal consequence."). 
9. An attempt to map out Kant's epistemology and metaphysics - often the subject of an 
entire university course - in one footnote would be both arrogant and futile. However, a brief 
review may place Kelsen's analogy in clearer focus. 
Kant's famous Critique of Pure Reason was, in part, an objection to empiricism, the belief 
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Wilson uncovers several difficulties. First, she questions Kelsen's use 
of the Kantian notion of categories10 beyond the phenomenal ("is") to 
the normative ("ought") world. 11 As Kant found twelve a priori con-
cepts that order the chaotic jumble of colors, sounds, and smells that 
make up the universe, so, Wilson summarizes, "Kelsen wants us to 
believe that legal materials are ordered and unified in a system because 
we have, contained a priori in the original powers of the mind, the 
principle of Zurechnung" (p. 55). Wilson not only points out that the 
normative realm is terra incognita to Kant's categories, but also argues 
that Kelsen's analogy may be anti-Kantian because Kant himself re-
fused to apply his transcendental method beyond the phenomenal 
realm (pp. 55-56). 
In addition, Wilson argues that Kelsen's zurechnung bears no fa-
milial resemblance to Kant's a priori categories. Specifically, Wilson 
that knowledge is derived directly from the senses. In it, Kant contends that there are aspects of 
reality independent of sensation. Kant calls these aspects a priori. 
According to Kant, a priori concepts are part of a mental apparatus which orders the physi-
cal world into comprehensible form. A few examples should clarify this notion. One example of 
a priori knowledge is space. We cannot see space. Nor can we perceive it by any of the other 
senses. Instead, space is an "intuition" that our mind applies to the sensory data it receives. In 
Kant's view, unless we apply these a priori concepts, which he divides into various categories, see 
note 10 infra, the world is an incomprehensible jumble of stimuli, which have no inherent order 
of their own. 
It may be helpful to consider a rather American application of this German philosophy. 
Mom places her famous apple pie in the refrigerator and closes the door. Our sensory data tell us 
that this time-honored delicacy has disappeared. Yet this observation never develops into a 
thought because we apply the a priori concept that the world has continuity to it. Thus, Kant 
concludes, what we consider reality is really a synthesis of a priori concepts and the constant flow 
of sensory data. Scholars differ over whether Kant believed the light went out when the refriger-
ator door was closed. 
Having reviewed Kant's basic stance, the notion of causality as an a priori concept is easier to 
comprehend. Just as the a priori concept of space operates as a lens through which we view the 
jumbled physical world in spatial terms, so does the a priori concept that events have causes 
render our view of reality in causal terms. See I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON *189-211. 
For a concise exegesis of the six proofs Kant employed to establish his theory, see N. SMITH, A 
COMMENTARY TO KANT'S "CRITIQUE OF PURE REAsON" 363-81 (1918). 
10. Kant divided his twelve a priori categories into four sets of three: 
Quantity Quality 
Unity Reality 
Plurality Negation 
Totality Limitation 
Relation Modality 
Inherence and Subsistence Possibility and Impossibility 
Cause and Effect Existence and Non-Existence 
Community Necessity and Contingency 
I. KANT, supra note 9, at •so. For a superb introduction to the categories, see J. WATSON, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF KANT EXPLAINED 128-36 (1908). 
11. Pp. 55-56. Kelsen believed that human behavior could be the subject of both phenome-
nal and normative interpretations. On the one hand, it can be the subject of empirical statements 
such as: "If people run rapidly up a mountain, their heart rates will increase." On the other 
hand, human behavior can also be viewed as the subject of normative statements such as: "If 
people run up mountains they ought to be punished." Kant's Critique dealt with the first sort of 
statement; Kelsen attempted to apply Kant's analysis to the second sort. See GENERAL THE-
ORY, supra note 8, at 445. 
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finds Kelsen's analogy misleading because zurechnung, unlike Kant's 
categories, neither regulates empirical inquiries nor constitutes experi-
ence (p. 57). This shortcoming appears to be inescapable because the 
attachment principle behind zurechnung cannot exist without a valid 
norm. Thus, Wilson concludes, Kelsen's claim that zurechnung is an a 
priori principle12 is an empty one because zurechnung is unavailable to 
help define the normative meaning of human speech and conduct. 
, Such epistemological impotence, Wilson concludes, ill-befits a true a 
priori category. 
Acknowledging that Kelsen has fiddled with the Kantian map 
somewhat, Hillel Steiner13 makes a hearty attempt to salvage the 
Kant-Kelsen connection in his paper, Kant's Kelsenianism (p. 65). 
Although his response to Wilson comes close to "eclectic nit-picking" 
(p. 65), Steiner fares rather well. First, in what very nearly amounts to 
feigned puzzlement, Steiner asks why Wilson views Kelsen's neo-
Kantian influence as evidence counting against Kantianism. After all, 
Steiner explains, the mission of the neo-Kantian included carrying the 
torch of Kant's Critique to the new frontiers of social and behavioral 
sciences (p. 66). More fundamentally, Steiner examines Kant's Meta-
physical Elements of Justice and suggests that Kant's map contains 
numerous Kelsenian directions. Steiner quotes Kant: 
Imputation (imputatio) in its moral meaning is the judgement by which 
someone is regarded as the originator (causa libera ['free cause']) of an 
action. . . . If this judgement also carries with it the juridical conse-
quences of this deed, it is a judicial [rechtskrizftig] imputation .... The 
juridical effect of demerit is punishment (poena). [pp. 70-71] 
In light of this resemblance, Steiner concludes that while each theory 
has its problems, they are nonetheless quite similar. Unfortunately, 
Steiner overlooks the fact that his Kant, the ethical absolutist, is not 
Wilson's Kant, the epistemological relativist. 
An equally provocative dialogue deals with the role, if any, justice 
plays in Kelsen's Pure Theory. Fortunately, the discussion does not 
wind down the trail of earlier endeavors to show, once and for all, that 
Kant's ethical relativism does not bespeak amorality or immorality, 
but manifests an unwillingness to believe that absolute values are de-
monstrable by cognitive verification. Instead, the discussion moves 
headlong up the summit of Kelsen's avowed ethical relativism. 
In Kelsen's Theory of Law and Philosophy of Justice (p. 273), Jes 
Bjarup, 14 like Wilson, contends that Kelsen is an impostor of sorts, 
claiming to rise toward ethical relativism while actually clambering to 
the peak of ethical absolutism. Bjarup demonstrates this alleged im-
12. See Method and Concepts, supra note 6, at 485 (Zurechnung is the "a priori category for 
the comprehension of the empirical legal material."). 
13. Hillel Steiner is at the University of Manchester. 
14. Jes Bjarup is at the University of Aarhus. 
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posture by pointing out inconsistencies of Kelsen's theory with tradi-
tional ethical relativism. The most notable inconsistency lies with 
Kelsen's commitment to tolerance. Bjarup's point is crushingly sim-
ple: Kelsen's view that "the principle of tolerance is 'self-evident' " (p. 
301) indicates a hidden belief that this act of will is also an act of 
reason. If that is so, the Pure Theory collapses, because reason, that 
is, the practice of knowing, merges with norm creation, the act of will-
ing. As a result, Bjarup brands Kelsen an impostor. A more charita-
ble conclusion might be that Kelsen's passion for tolerance caused 
him, in a moment of carelessness, to stroll into a quagmire of 
contradiction. 
Kelsen receives a far more indulgent interpretation from Philip 
Pettit15 in his essay, Ke/sen on Justice: A Charitable Reading (p. 305). 
Pettit reacts to what he feels is an unnecessarily harsh reading of Kel-
sen; in effect, he attempts to rehabilitate the Pure Theory from 
Bjarup's cross-examination. For example, Pettit tries to salvage Kel-
sen's position on tolerance by drawing a distinction between evalua-
tions and prescriptions, the former relating to tolerance as a product of 
practical reason and the latter relating to norm-creation (pp. 313-14). 
In this endeavor Pettit behaves like a desperate attorney trying to pres-
ent the testimony of his star witness through ventriloquism. That is, 
Pettit draws distinctions that Kelsen either neglected or refused to 
make. In the end, Pettit can ask only that Kelsen not be read too 
literally. 
Pettit's attempt to defend Kelsen reflects a general impulse - to 
cut the Gordian knot of seeming contradiction with a sharper version 
of Kelsen's theories - that runs through many of the essays. Fortu-
nately, the book's dialectical format serves to expose any such miscon-
ceptions of (or disloyalties to) Kelsen's body of work. 
A final refreshing feature of Essays on Ke/sen is its almost uniform 
clarity. Kelsenian scholarship generally brings to mind pages of ency-
clopedic sentences which leave subject and predicate completely out of 
shouting distance of each other. Such obscurity almost invariably sig-
nals an intellectual fog ahead. When scaling the dizzying heights of 
Kelsen's work, such fogginess is neither desirable nor, as Essays on 
Ke/sen demonstrates, necessary. For modern readers, these essays 
present a safe and invigorating ascent into the high country of legal 
positivism. 
- Julio A. Thompson 
15. Philip Pettit is at Australian National University. 
